As Plastic Treaty negotiations move towards INC-5.4, Valeria Branca, Chair of the ISWA Working Group on Governance and Legal Issues, explains why Extended Producer Responsibility must be designed as a transparent system of shared responsibilities and dedicated financing, and introduces ISWA’s practical roadmap for implementation.
Negotiations on the global instrument on plastic pollution are moving towards INC-5.4. The previous session, held in Geneva in February 2026, elected a new Chair but did not include substantive negotiations. Informal work is now under way to prepare the next session.
The difficult questions of ambition and scope remain, but so does an equally practical one: how will countries turn the eventual treaty into systems that work on the ground?
The ISWA Working Group on Governance and Legal Issues developed the second edition of EPR in the Plastic Treaty: A Practical Roadmap for Policy and Commitment to address one part of that implementation challenge. Prepared with the ISWA Plastic Treaty Task Force and contributors from across ISWA, the Technical Note draws on experience from existing schemes and sets out a five-step route for governments establishing or strengthening Extended Producer Responsibility systems.
The central message is simple. Including EPR in a treaty text will not guarantee results. The legal framework, allocation of responsibilities, financing model, data systems and enforcement arrangements will determine whether EPR reduces plastic pollution or becomes little more than a charge collected from producers.
EPR is more than a levy
EPR assigns producers financial and, where appropriate, organisational responsibility for products once they become waste. It applies the Polluter Pays Principle to the companies that place products on the market and can generate dedicated funding for prevention, collection, sorting, recycling, safe treatment of residues and public communication.
A simple eco-levy or pollution tax does not achieve the same thing. If money enters a general public budget while municipalities remain solely responsible for delivering the system, the operational link between producer responsibility, costs and performance is lost.
In a genuine EPR scheme, producer contributions should cover the net necessary costs of managing the obligated waste stream and remain ring-fenced for that purpose. This does not mean that EPR can finance every part of waste management or replace government. Public authorities must continue to set policy objectives, plan services and infrastructure, supervise performance and enforce the law.
EPR must also sit alongside measures on waste prevention, reuse, product design, recycled content and environmentally sound disposal. It is part of an integrated system, not a substitute for one.
Five steps for governments
The Technical Note proposes a phased approach that countries can adapt to their social, economic, geographic and institutional conditions.
Engage the people already in the system
Governments should begin by mapping existing collection and recycling channels, infrastructure, costs and responsibilities. Consultation must include producers, retailers, municipalities, waste operators and civil society, as well as waste pickers, itinerant collectors, community organisations and Indigenous communities where relevant.
In many countries, the informal sector already performs essential collection and sorting work. A just transition requires representation in decision-making, fair compensation, training and social protection rather than displacement.
Establish clear and enforceable rules
Legislation should define the products and producers in scope, measurable performance targets, reporting duties, competent authorities and sanctions. It should also allocate responsibilities precisely.
Governments set the objectives and oversee the system; local authorities retain territorial planning functions; Producer Responsibility Organisations manage the operational tasks assigned to them. Where a single or limited number of PROs is used to improve coherence and oversight, public supervision and procedural safeguards remain essential.
Design a transparent financial model
Producer contributions should reflect the net necessary costs of managing the obligated products. Countries may begin with a relatively simple fee structure and introduce more sophisticated fee modulation as data and institutional capacity improve.
Mature systems can reward recyclability, reuse and other design improvements, but environmental incentives cannot replace accurate cost coverage. Revenues, expenditure and allocations should be publicly reported.
Build data and enforcement capacity
Credible EPR depends on knowing who places products on the market, in what quantities, and what happens to the resulting waste. Central producer registers, unique identifiers, standardised digital reporting, independent audits and public disclosure make it harder to free-ride or under-report.
Regulators need enough staff and authority to cross-check declarations, investigate non-compliance and apply meaningful sanctions.
Pilot learn and raise ambition
A nationwide system should not be designed on assumptions alone. Targeted pilots can test collection methods, fee levels, communication and the integration of existing operators.
Regulators should then use evidence on collection, contamination, cost recovery and design changes to adjust the framework, scale what works and discontinue approaches that do not serve the public interest.
Governance failures are predictable
Experience also shows where EPR systems fail. Too many competing PROs for the same waste stream can fragment responsibilities and make enforcement harder. Brand-led or material-selective schemes can encourage cherry-picking, with valuable materials collected while low-value or non-recyclable obligated plastics remain with public services.
Weak producer registers leave compliant companies paying for free-riders. Poor transparency makes it difficult to see whether fees are being spent efficiently or whether targets are being met.
The division of responsibilities is particularly important. A PRO needs enough operational autonomy to organise services, procure capacity and support innovation. At the same time, it must remain accountable to a competent authority for legal compliance and results.
The state should not run the PRO’s day-to-day operations, and the PRO should not take over the state’s regulatory role. Conflicts of interest within governance bodies must be identified and managed, especially where the organisations receiving funds also influence how budgets are allocated.
Common rules with room for national realities
A global treaty can help align definitions, reporting formats, target-setting methods and recyclability criteria. This would reduce loopholes, improve comparability and create fairer conditions for producers operating across borders. Common approaches to producer registration and information exchange would also strengthen action against online and cross-border free-riding.
National systems still need to reflect local realities. Collection in a dense city is different from collection across remote rural areas or small island states.
The role of municipalities, existing private operators and informal workers also varies widely. The objective should be a common level of accountability and environmental performance, supported by implementation pathways that countries can build and improve over time.
The work can start before the treaty is final
The themes of political commitment, waste planning, economics and the circular economy will be central to the ISWA World Congress 2026 in London. EPR sits at their intersection. It connects legal obligations with the practical organisation and financing of waste services, while giving producers a direct interest in better product design and material recovery.
Governments do not need to wait for the final treaty text to begin. They can map producers and waste flows, assess infrastructure, consult affected communities, strengthen registration and reporting, and define the public institutions that will supervise the system. These foundations take time to build, particularly where waste services and administrative capacity remain limited.
The value of EPR will ultimately be measured through collection that reaches all communities, environmentally sound treatment, transparent use of funds and products that are easier to prevent, reuse and recycle. The treaty can provide direction and shared expectations. Delivery will depend on the governance choices made in each country.
